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Privacy on the web- Tracker Example
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User Concerns
●

Amount of malicious content on web?
○
○

●

Around 18.5 million websites are compromised at a given time each week
Average website attacked 44 times a day

What are the options for a user?
○
○
○

Do Not Track- Websites do not have to honour
Blocker Extensions
Brave Browser

https://www.securityweek.com/185-million-websites-infected-malware-any-time
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User Tracking Concerns

Mayer, J.R., Mitchell, J.C.: Third-party web tracking: Policy and technology. In:
2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. pp. 413–427. IEEE (2012)
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Existing solutions
●

●

Browsers

There are more than 80 browsers in the industry,
including popular ones such as Google Chrome,
Apple Safari, Mozilla Firefox.
Some of these are more committed to privacy
than others such as Brave who disable third-party
cookies to ensure user privacy, which in turn can
limit usability.

Is user safe from only browser?

Web Users
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Browser Extensions
●
●

●

A browser extension is a small software module
for customizing a web browser.
Extensions are small software programs that
customize the browsing experience. They
enable users to tailor Chrome functionality and
behavior to individual needs or preferences.
They are built on web technologies such as
HTML, JavaScript, and CSS.

●
Is user safe from
browser and
extensions?

Web Users

●

There are many browser extensions for privacy
and top extensions are, Ghostery, Ublock,
Simple Blocker, and AdBlock.
Still, can attackers gain access to user data?
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Limitations of existing solutions
Extension

Web-origin

●

Allow all execution
Malicious data

●

Block all

●
Browser
Block all or do nothing.

Existing browser extensions only enforce block
on all the attacks or allow there is no
categorization.
Extensions are predefined, so there are new
trackers or other third-party content they are
not blocked by these extensions.
Popular security extensions like Ghostery and
uBlock do not detect data leakage from
sources and sinks.
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Motivation
●

Preserve user privacy on the web
○
○

●
●

Third-party trackers
Malicious injected webpage content

Allow for an ethical middle ground for the collection of user data with the
consent of the user
User-centric
○
○

User defined control for third-party privacy accessibility
Allow user in real time to make privacy relevant decisions
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Our Approach
●

Monitor JavaScript sources and sinks, distinguishing origin of code
○
○

●

Sources and Sinks: Where any JS API can execute
Utilize runtime stack to distinguish between first/third-party code

Enforce policies on these channels to protect against privacy violations,
based on code origin
third-party

Our
Policy
Interception of deﬁned policy

Block
Execution
third-party-js

Execute
Policy

Allow execution
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How do we enforce a policy?
●

When a monitored JavaScript API is called
○
○
○

Determine origin of code using runtime stack
Screen through relevant policy
Allow API to proceed or block the call in the case of a violation
■ Consult the user in the case of a privacy violation to allow for an override if requested
Security
Relevant
Method call

Wrap
Function

Determine
Origin

Block the
Third-party Origin
execution of
the method

First-party Origin

Allow
execution of
the method
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Policy Example: Read Cookie
If the determined origin is not allowed to read the cookie, then we block
the request
Object.defineProperty(document, "cookie",
{get: function(){ //JavaScript attempts to read the cookie
//Determine the origin of the code
//if origin is allowed
//return the original value
//else
//block the request
},
//...
});
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Policy Example: Image Policies
Img sources are wrapped and passed through policies to protect
against malicious content in img sources
var imgPolicy = {
get: function(obj, prop) { /* policies for get */},
set: function(obj, prop, value) { /* policies for set */}
};
//save the original image
class ImageWrapper {
constructor(height, width) {
//create image object from original image
//pass image object through relevant policy
//return sanitized image
}
}
//replace the requested image with sanitized image
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Interception of operation
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MyWebGuard Browser Extension Implementation
●
Request / Response
Unload

MyWebGuard
Library

●

Process the document and
Load the DOM

Page Load

●

We have developed a JavaScript library and
deployed in the browser extension to self-protect
the web users.
Our interception library(CoreFlashJax) run first
before a web page is loaded, we have implemented
our JavaScript library code in innerHTML property
so that when page loads it will be set as a first
current page.
We have implemented interception for data source
access and data sink channels.
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Evaluation Setup
●

We set up on our host websites (first-party) with third-party JavaScript code
implemented
○

We test our extension on the host website with simulated attacks from third party code

<script
src="https://mywebguard-thirdparty.github.io/script.js "
></script>
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Demonstration
We notice that data leakage
and tracking requests are
caught by MyWebGuard and
users would be notified

However, the simulated data leakage
and tracking requests were ignored by
uBlock, one of the popular browser
privacy extensions
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Functionality
-

-

When examining Brave
browser, which has a
JavaScript-blocking
mechanism, we test some
websites
We notice several breakages
and loading issues (such as
YouTube)
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Functionality
-

We do not notice any issues
when loading those websites
(like YouTube) with MyWebGuard
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Runtime Evaluation
●

We tested MyWebGuard with both Chromium and Brave browsers (on Ubuntu
18.04.2 LTS) on real websites
○

The overheads are not noticeable as
shown in the graph
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Contribution
●
●
●
●

Browser-agnostic approach to preventing privacy leakage not monitored by
contemporary solutions
Present a compromise to “all-or-nothing” filter lists
Advances conventional same-origin policy standard by enforcing different
policies for each source of code
Evaluation of approach overhead shows a lightweight yet effective
implementation
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Future Work
●

Extend and refine policies and enforcement mechanism
○
○

●
●

Machine learning to produce practical policies
Effectiveness when built into a browser

Allow for end-users to customize privacy preferences
Perform large-scale evaluations of MyWebGuard
○
○

On top websites
Interference with co-existing browser extensions
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Runtime Evaluation
We now test our extension on different sites (such as EBay, Amazon,
FaceBook…)
To avoid anomalies, we test each site 10 times, recording the loading times (time
for a site to finish loading its required contents
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Runtime Evaluation
We tested MyWebGuard with both Chromium and Brave browsers (on Ubuntu
18.04.2 LTS) using our testing simulation
There exists a slowdown time on both browsers, which is due to the runtime stack
that helps track the code origin
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